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Deviant Causation and the Law 
Sara Bernstein, University of Notre Dame 
 
 A gunman intends to shoot and kill Victim. He shoots and misses his target, but 
the gunshot startles a group of water buffalo, causing them to trample the victim to death. 
The gunman brings about the intended effect, Victim’s death, but in a “deviant” way 
rather than the one planned. This paper argues that such causal structures, deviant causal 
chains, pose serious problems for several key legal concepts. A deviant causal chain 
occurs when an outcome is brought about through different or “deviant” means rather 
than the means intended. What the law makes of these cases, and how the law should 
handle them, is the focus of this paper. 
 Here is the plan. After a few preliminaries (§1), I show that deviant causal chains 
pose problems for the legal distinction between attempts and completed crimes, and also 
for the distinction between attempts and mere preparations (§2). I then suggest that cases 
of deviant causation undermine notions of legal liability for completed crimes in terms of 
actus reus and mens rea, and argue that natural accounts of negligence misclassify some 
cases involving deviant causal chains (§3). After diagnosing several conceptual 
vulnerabilities in the law revealed by deviant causal chains (§4), I show that natural 
strategies for shoring up legal theories in the face of these examples are unpromising 
(§5).  
 
1. Preliminaries  
  
 Deviant causal chains share a common structure: an agent intends to bring about 
x, and x occurs in a different way than that intended or expected by the agent.1 Following 
Davidson (1963), I will call basic deviant causal chains those deviant causal processes  
initiated by mere intentions. An example of basic deviance, drawn from Davidson, is the 
following:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Here I focus on cases of deviant causation initiated by agents, but the cases need not involve initiation by 
an agent. For example, a falling boulder might kill a victim by startling her to death rather than crushing 
her. Nor do legal contexts require that deviant causal chains be initiated by agents. For example, a jury 
might puzzle over whether climate change damage can occur in a peculiar way, as when a homeowner is 
injured while packing his bags in anticipation of an upcoming flood. Thanks to [blinded] for the latter 
example. 
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 (Mountaineer) A mountaineer intends to eventually rid himself of the man below 
 him on the rope by dropping him. Merely forming the intention so unnerves him 
 that he  loosens his grip on the rope, dropping the fellow climber.  
 
Here, the mere intention to murder the fellow mountaineer initiates a causal chain leading 
to the murder. This and similar cases are to be contrasted with nonbasic deviant causal 
chains, which stem from an intention and a particular action stemming from the intention. 
An example of nonbasic deviance is the following: 
 
 (Bad Shot) Assassin A is dispatched to kill Victim. Assassin A shoots at 
 Victim, but misses. The shot wakes up Assassin B, who was independently 
 dispatched by a different assassination agency. Assassin B shoots Victim and kills 
 him. (Assassin B would not have shot had Assassin A not awakened him.) Had 
 Assassin A not shot, Victim would not have died. 
 
Here, Assassin A not only intends to kill Victim, but also takes a shot in service to doing 
so. The shot doesn’t directly kill Victim, but does make it the case that Victim dies, in 
virtue of causing Assassin B to shoot. Cases of nonbasic deviance are so-called because 
there is an action in addition to an intention after which the causal chain goes awry 
relative to the agent’s plan. The extra action exemplifies nonbasic deviance. I will largely 
focus my discussion on cases of nonbasic deviance, since poor intentions alone are 
neither criminal nor tortious. 
 Deviant causal chains can be further distinguished along several dimensions. 
There are those that contain causal processes very different in type from the one planned 
by the agent. One example is the one with which we began, in which a gunshot wakes up 
a herd of angry water buffalo. The causal process that includes stampeding water buffalo 
is a very different sort of causal process than the one that includes a direct gunshot. 
Contrast the water buffalo case with Bad Shot, in which Assassin A’s shot causes 
Assassin B’s shot, which results in Victim’s death: one causal process involving a 
gunshot is swapped for a very similar sort of process, namely, a different gunshot.  Call 
those deviant causal chains containing a very different sort of causal processes than the 
one planned process-divergent, and those containing a similar sort of causal processes to 
the one planned process-similar.  
 A parallel distinction can be drawn with respect to the nature of the outcome 
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planned by the agent. Some deviant causal chains eventuate in an outcome unlike the one 
planned by the agent, while still involving some shared essential planned part with the 
planned one, e.g., a particular victim’s death. If Jane plots to kill Jacintha by gradually 
adding drops of slow-acting poison to her toothpaste, but Jacintha dies by choking on the 
same toothpaste that would have eventually killed her in any case, Jacintha dies a 
different sort of death than the one Jane had planned. Call this sort of event outcome-
divergent. Contrast this sort with Bad Shot, in which Victim dies a very similar death to 
the one Assassin A had initially planned, i.e., death via gunshot. Call this latter sort of 
case outcome-similar. As I shall suggest, these distinctions become important when 
attempting to draw lessons for the law from deviant causation.  
 Deviant causal processes pose problems for legal concepts because the 
“ingredients” for criminal and tortious liability are present, but the cases do not easily or 
correctly fit into existing legal taxonomies of crimes. Such cases also reveal important 
ambiguities in the law involving differences between an agent’s intended outcome and 
the actual outcome. 
 Problems with deviant causal chains arise in part because the standard for 
establishing the presence of causation in tort law and in criminal law is the simple 
counterfactual “but-for” test: is it the case that but for the occurrence of x, y wouldn’t 
have occurred? Since deviant causal chains are initiated by elements that pass the but-for 
test (i.e., if the legally relevant intention and action hadn’t occurred, the deviantly caused 
outcome wouldn’t have occurred), deviant causation becomes the vehicle for legal 
responsibility. So I will demonstrate in the following sections. 
 
2. Deviant Causal Chains and Attempts 
 
 Here I will suggest that deviant causal chains cause several problems for legal 
treatments of attempts. Intuitively, an attempt is different than a completed crime insofar 
as a mere attempt does not result in the intended crime, whereas a completed crime 
eventuates in the intended outcome. For example, if Jane attempts to injure Jacintha by 
taking a hammer to her toe, but misses and succeeds only in scaring her, Jane would be 
legally culpable for an attempted crime rather than a completed one.  
 Roughly, a criminal attempt occurs when (i) there is specific intent to commit a 
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crime, and (ii) the offender takes direct action toward completion of the crime. More 
specifically, many US states share a definition of a criminal attempt according to which 
“A person commits the offense of attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense, 
he or she does any act that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that 
offense.” ((720 ILCS 5/8-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 8-4). According to Model Penal Code 
(USA) (Part 1, General Provisions, Article 5, Inchoate Crimes), a person is guilty of an 
attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for 
commission of the crime, s/he: 
 
 (a) purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the 
 attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or 
      
 (b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to do 
 anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such 
 result without further conduct on his part; or 
      
 (c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as s/he 
 believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a 
 course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. 
 
Satisfying the definition of a criminal attempt often depends on the establishment of mens 
rea and actus reus, regardless of what actually occurs as a result of these things. For 
example, Jane’s formation of the intention to injure Jacintha, along with swinging a 
hammer near her toe, counts as an attempt regardless of whether the hammer landed one 
inch from Jacintha’s toe or five inches from Jacintha’s toe. What makes Jane’s action an 
attempt rather than a completed crime is that Jane does not succeed in bringing about 
what she intends, i.e., injuring Jacintha.  
 Or so one might think. Nonbasic deviant causal chains exploit this way of 
drawing the line between attempts and completed crimes, posing at least two specific 
problems. First, what would ordinarily be thought of as an attempted crime eventuates in 
the intended outcome, such that a deviant causal chain satisfies the definition of a 
completed crime rather than a mere attempt. In nonbasic deviant cases, an agent both 
forms an intention and performs an action that counts as a substantial step towards the 
crime. The intended outcome is even caused by the agent’s act. But the scenario does not 
(and should not) count as a completed crime by the agent, given that the means through 
which the outcome is brought about are different than those intended. In Bad Shot, 
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Assassin A intends to cause Victim’s death, and takes substantial action in service to 
doing so. Moreover, Victim’s death occurs, and wouldn’t have occurred had it not been 
for Assassin A’s shot. Assassin A’s shot should count only as an attempt rather than a 
completed crime. Because the intended outcome actually occurs, however, Assassin A 
counts as having initiated a completed crime rather than an attempt.2 Exacerbating this 
problem is that many such cases also respect the legal concurrence requirement for actus 
reus and mens rea3: in Bad Shot, the intention and the act are concurrently timed. So the 
synchronicity requirement on actus reus and mens rea cannot be used to recategorize 
deviant causal chains. 
 Deviant causal chains also make trouble for the distinction between attempts and 
mere preparations. What one would ordinarily think of as merely preparing to attempt the 
crime instead counts as a full-blooded attempt or a completed crime, owing to fortuitous 
occurrence of the outcome. Consider the following case:  
 
 (Murderous Lover) Jane plots to murder Jacintha by poisoning her drink. While 
 preparing the poison, Jane is so nervous that she breaks the bottle of poison. 
 Very shortly thereafter, Jacintha slips on a splinter of glass from the broken 
 poison bottle, and dies from the fall. 
 
 
Intuitively, Jane was only preparing to attempt to murder Jacintha. If Jacintha’s death had 
not occurred, Jane’s actions would not have counted as anything but a mere preparation.  
But because Jane’s mere preparation results in the ultimately intended outcome, 
preparing the attempt counts (minimally) as the attempt itself. Another example: 
 
 (Bad Driver) Jane plots to murder Jacintha with a hatchet. As she is driving to 
 Sears to buy a hatchet, she fails to see a pedestrian in the pedestrian walkway, and 
 hits and kills the pedestrian. Upon rushing out of the car, she realizes the 
 pedestrian was Jacintha. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Cases of basic deviance sometimes generate similar puzzles. In Davidson’s basic deviance case, the 
mountaineer’s murderous intention so unnerves him that it causally results in the desired outcome. But does 
Mountaineer’s dropping his partner count as a full-blooded criminal attempt? If we say “yes”, it should be 
uneasily: the mountaineer did not consciously take action in service to murdering his climbing partner. A 
deviant causal chain resulting from a mere intention should be punished differently than a full-blooded 
attempt, at the very least. Even calling it a half-hearted	  attempt seems too strong. If we say “no”, it should 
also be uneasily: the mountaineer was poorly intentioned and should be held legally accountable for 
something. Involuntary manslaughter isn’t a perfect fit, either, since an intention to harm is present. 
Voluntary manslaughter, perhaps, is the best fit, though this might be seen as too strong on many readings 
of the case.	  3	  Husak (2017) explores the concurrence condition in detail. 
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It seems clear that Jane has merely begun to prepare to murder Jacintha rather than carry 
out the attempt. The law, however, is forced to view such preparations as attempts 
simpliciter, due to the collective presence of mens rea, actus rea, and the intended 
outcome. 
 Nor do existing philosophical accounts of attempts handle this problem well. 
According to Yaffe’s (2010) proposed definition, an attempt includes a causal chain that 
begins with an intention that plays the proper causal role and ends with the world 
matching its content. But in failing to give a theory of what it is for the intention to play a 
proper causal role, the account classifies Murderous Lover and Bad Driver as attempts 
rather than mere preparations. Yaffe discloses this vulnerability in his account of 
attempts, admitting: 
 
 “What constraints must a causal chain that begins with the intention and ends with 
 the world matching its content meet if it is to be an instance in which the intention 
 plays the proper causal role? This is a very difficult question for which I do not 
 have a complete answer, and I do not have an answer that “solves” cases of 
 deviant causation.” (2010, p. 86)  
 
The challenge is in specifying the appropriate connection between the intention and the 
way the outcome occurs. The most natural answer is that outcome must be caused by the 
intention. In deviant causal chains, however, outcomes are caused by intentions, and yet 
the outcome does not occur in the way intended: a fact relevant to, but not accounted for, 
by legal treatments of these cases.  
 
3. Deviant Causal Chains and Negligence 
 
 It is tempting to think that deviant causal chains are so outré as to not warrant 
major concern. One might admit that these very strange cases present problems for 
existing legal taxonomies, yet think there is no major reason to worry about them given 
their rarity. But as I shall now argue, deviant causal processes play a major role in 
extremely common legal scenarios, negligence torts, and reveal a host of issues lurking in 
the background of more normal negligence cases. 
 Negligence occurs when there is “failure to act with a prudence that a reasonable 
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person would have under the same circumstances,” and the failure to act results in harm.   
According to Model Penal Code (§2.02(2) (d)), “[a] person acts negligently…when he 
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or 
will result from his conduct.” A negligent act that causes foreseeable harm or injury 
counts as liable negligence in the law. Five specific elements are required for negligence: 
duty (whether a defendant owed a duty to a plaintiff), breach of duty (violation of what 
was owed), cause-in-fact (causation as given by the but-for test), proximate causation 
(foreseeable causal result of negligence), and damages (harm or injury to plaintiff). 
 Prima facie, legal responsibility for negligent deviant causation is an unstable 
concept since foreseeability is required for negligence torts. Given the unexpected nature 
of deviant causal chains, it might seem like such cases don’t involve foreseeable 
outcomes, and so there is no such thing as deviant negligence. In most cases of 
negligence, moreover, cause-in-fact and proximate causation often go together. Consider 
the following example: 
 
 (Rollercoaster) Joe owns a fairground and the rollercoaster tracks have rusted 
 away. Children are mounting the ride. One child, Jane, notices the flaw and runs 
 off to tell someone, but trips and dies on the way. Joe’s negligence caused Jane’s 
 death. But Joe is not legally responsible for Jane’s death. 
 
Here, Joe’s negligence in letting the tracks rust away causes the child to trip and die. 
According to the law, Joe is not legally culpable: because Jane’s death in that particular 
way was not foreseeable, Joe is not responsible for the death despite causing it. 
 But cause-in-fact and proximate causation do not necessarily come apart in cases 
involving deviant causal chains. There can be foreseeable outcomes caused by negligent 
actions that should not necessarily be legally classified as negligence. Consider the 
following example: 
 
 (Cardiac Arrest) Jacquise knows that Kaia is heart attack-prone. Jacquise jumps 
 out from behind a pillar and scares Kaia. Kaia laughs at the dangerous prank, but 
 in doing so, becomes distracted and trips over a planter. The surprise of tripping 
 over the planter causes a heart attack.  
  
This case has every element required for negligence. Jacquise has a duty to Kaia not to 
perform actions that might cause a heart attack, and breaches that duty by surprising her. 
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Jacquise can foresee that Kaia might die of a heart attack if he surprises her. Had he not 
jumped out from behind the pillar, Kaia would not have died. And Jacquise causes injury 
by causing the heart attack. Intuitively, however, such a case should not count as 
negligence, since the heart attack was deviantly caused. 
 It is worth noting that case law yields mixed results on the lesson of this latter sort 
of case. Generally, if an outcome is caused in an unforeseeable way, the defendant is not 
liable for damages. In Bunting v. Hogsett, however, the law ruled in the opposite 
direction. Hogsett, a train operator, conducted a railroad engine far above the speed limit. 
In an attempt to avoid a crash with plaintiff Bunting’s train, Hogsett reversed the throttle, 
shut off the engine, and jumped from the train, in the hopes that such actions would 
prevent a collision. The collision occurred nevertheless, and did not immediately injure 
Bunting. However the crash did reactivate the engine on the original train, which then 
struck Bunting, injuring him. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in the plaintiff’s 
favor: 
 
 “[…] It was the engineer’s negligence that caused the first collision […] [The first 
 collision] opened the throttle, and turned loose the destructive agency which 
 inflicted the injuries complained of.” (21 A at 32)  
 
Even though the particular route of harm was unforeseeable, the plaintiff recovered 
damages.  
 Similarly in Sundquist v. Madison Railways Co. That case concerns a victim of a 
negligently caused streetcar accident. Though she was physically unharmed by the 
accident, she was psychologically traumatized by it. Months after the traumatic accident, 
the victim heard a streetcar bell ring and became so frightened at the sound that she 
tripped, fell, and was paralyzed by the fall. Though neither the particular form of harm 
nor the route by which it occurred were foreseeable, the court ruled in her favor. Still, this 
sort of ruling is unusual. The law’s internal conflict about the significance of the type of 
causal process leading to harm only reinforces the idea that there should be more legal 
thought on process-divergence and outcome-divergence. Ideally, the law should provide 
as detailed principles as possible for applying rules of culpability and responsibility, 
rather than leaving such decisions up to individual rulings. In the next section, I diagnose 
where and why the law goes wrong.  
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4.0 Diagnoses 
 It’s not that the criminals or tortfeasors in these fictional and real cases are 
completely unaccountable. It’s that their situations are either misclassified or 
unclassifiable under current legal treatments of the relevant concepts. Where does the law 
go wrong? I hereby identify several problems exposed by deviant causal chains. 
  First, the law depends on a particular outcome’s nonoccurrence or occurrence to 
undergird a distinction between an attempt and a completed crime. In cases of both basic 
and nonbasic deviance, however, the intended outcome actually occurs. Thus conditions 
for completed crimes and completed attempts are satisfied even when the cases are not 
good fits for existing legal categories.  
 Second, the law leaves open whether process-similarity or process-divergence 
effects legal culpability, which is to say, how closely an actual causal chain resulting 
from an instigator’s action must adhere to the instigator’s planned way of bringing about 
the outcome. The law leaves open, for example, whether a death brought about by 
instigating a water buffalo-trampling with a gunshot should result in the same culpability 
as an intended death by direct gunshot, where the mens rea and actus rea are the same in 
both cases. A causal chain diverging wildly from the planned one, but with the desired 
result, satisfies the same conditions for liability as non-deviant causal scenarios.  
 Third, the law leaves open how closely the nature of an outcome must hew to an 
instigator’s plan for its occurrence—in my language, whether it is outcome-similar to or 
outcome-divergent from the planned event.  The obvious conceptual vulnerability lies in 
what it is for a crime to “match” an agent’s intention. In Murderous Lover, Jane’s death is 
brought about in a very different way than the one planned. But since the law doesn’t 
weigh in on how and whether such outcome-divergence affects criminal culpability, 
Jacintha can be legally responsible for Jane’s death even when the outcome occurs 
differently than what she had intended.  
 Metaphysically speaking, this problem is about the modal fragility of events. An 
event is modally fragile if it couldn’t have happened in a different manner without being 
a different event entirely. Clearly, outcomes for which people are criminally or civilly 
responsible are not maximally modally fragile: not even the best planner knows the 
precise second or spot at which the death will occur, or the exact manner in which it will. 
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But the failure of legal thinking on this matter means that there are no implicit or explicit 
standards for the modal fragility of intended outcomes, leaving existing legal definitions 
open to intuitive counterexamples. 
 Fourth, the conditions for legal responsibility for completed outcomes are heavily 
rooted in the key elements of but-for causation and concurrent mens rea and actus reus. 
Since all elements are present in nonbasic deviant causal chains, such cases end up 
satisfying definitions for more serious crimes than those committed. The most promising 
solutions might seem to be additions to the law that help eliminate such cases from 
counting as full-fledged crimes. But, as I shall suggest in §5, supplementing the 
requirements for legal accountability does not necessarily help. 
 Thus far, I have focused on how the law as it is currently structured is inadequate 
for the task of accounting for such cases correctly. But there is a more serious normative 
question lurking: what should the law say about these cases? How might the law be 
amended so that deviant causal chains do not pose obvious counterexamples? I do not 
have space to delve into this complex issue in depth, but I will conclude this section with 
a pessimistic observation.  
 Correctly classifying deviant causal chains in the law would require specific 
guidelines about causal process similarity and outcome similarity, i.e., how close a causal 
process and outcome must adhere to a criminal or tortfeasor’s original intentions. The 
idea would be for the law to require that an outcome for which an initiator is held 
responsible be “the right kind” of outcome, i.e., that the outcome must adhere fairly 
closely to the relevant mens rea. Similarly, the law would hold that a causal process be 
“the right kind” of causal process, i.e., that it must adhere fairly closely to the sort of 
causal process the initiator had planned. With these sorts of supplementary requirements, 
outcome-divergent and even process-divergent deviant causal scenarios would not satisfy 
existing legal definitions in the problematic ways detailed above. In the water buffalo 
case, Bad Driver, and Murderous Lover, the causal processes and particular natures of the 
outcomes diverge significantly from the intentions of the initiators: the outcomes occur in 
different ways and via different causal routes than those planned.  
 However, such guidelines would face major theoretical and practical barriers. 
First, it would be very difficult to give a precise, principled metric about process 
similarity and outcome similarity. Consider the following case: 
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 (Starry Night) Suppose that Maya plans to poison Tegan at 10pm when the storm 
 clouds are rolling in, for extra ghoulish dramatic effect. Maya runs late attempting 
 to mix the poison, however, and so arrives at Tegan’s house at 10:45pm. Maya 
 pushes Tegan off the balcony when the sky is starry and clear.  
 
Exactly how much process-divergence and outcome-divergence is there in this example? 
A precise, detailed answer seems very hard to give. It is a mostly intuitive matter. 
Additionally, a law building such a metric into the standard for legal culpability would 
require direct epistemic access to an agent’s intentions, as opposed to inferring them from 
what the agent said and did. Establishing mens rea is already a challenge, but ascertaining 
the contours of an agent’s very specific intentions for a crime or tort seems nigh 
impossible in this setting. 
 Second, the law would need principled rules for when to emphasize process-
similarity and outcome-similarity, and how much weight these should be given in legal 
culpability. In Bad Shot, Victim dies in very much the same way that Assassin A wanted, 
but the best classification of Assassin A’s action is as an attempt rather than a completed 
crime. In the other direction, being the “right kind of outcome” should not be the major 
criterion for culpability or liability. Consider the following case: 
 
 (Gang Shootout) Two rival gangs, Blue and Grey, are engaged in a standoff. 
 Shooter A from Blue breaking the standoff by shooting at Jelena, the leader of 
 Grey, but misses. Shooter B from Grey shoots at Shooter A from Blue, but 
 misses and ends up killing Jelena via friendly fire. 
 
Here, Shooter A initiates a causal chain via gunshot, intending to directly kill his rival. 
That the causal chain eventuates in his rival being killed by a gunshot specifically isn’t 
enough to make Shooter A culpable for Jelena’s death, however. The fact that Jelena’s 
death is “the right kind of outcome” seems less relevant than the complicated process by 
which it is brought about. 
 
5. Possible Repairs 
 
 In this section, I consider several possible repairs to legal concepts in light of the 
problems posed by deviant causal chains. Though some are promising partial fixes, I 
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suggest that none fully succeed.  
5.1 Foreseeability 
 
 The most obvious fix is already implemented in tort law: inclusion of a 
foreseeability constraint on legal responsibility. Though its contours are controversial, the 
basic idea of foreseeability is “whether one can see a systematic relationship between the 
type of accident that the plaintiff suffered and . . . the defendant’s [wrongdoing].”4 Since 
some deviant causal chains involve unforeseeable process-divergent and/ or outcome-
divergent effects, a foreseeability constraint does solve some problems with deviant 
causal chains. This is particularly the case for scenarios like Rollercoaster, in which the 
child’s tripping and dying is not a foreseeable consequence of the rusting tracks.  
 The foreseeability strategy faces several problems, however. The first problem is 
that foreseeability is presently only a constraint in tort law rather than criminal law, and 
generally only with respect to negligence. Thus the law as it is currently written leaves 
out deviant causal chains initiated by “positive” events such as gunshots, and most cases 
of criminal liability. A natural response would be to add more foreseeability conditions to 
the law, including criminal law and cases other than negligence. However this strategy 
faces several problems as well.  
 First, adding foreseeability to the other conditions for legal responsibility is not 
always sufficient to generate the correct result. In Bad Shot, Victim’s death is 
foreseeable, and yet Assassin A is not legally responsible for Victim’s death. And in 
Cardiac Arrest, Kaia’s potential heart attack is foreseeable and negligently caused, but 
still shouldn’t satisfy the legal definition of negligence. In both cases, the outcomes are 
foreseeable, but the processes by which they occurred are not. Adding foreseeability will 
overgenerate cases of legal responsibility. 
 Second and relatedly, it is very hard to construct a foreseeability constraint that is 
not too stringent or too lax. The law has already struggled to do so, as evidenced by 
several landmark negligence cases. The landmark Palsgraf vs. Long Island Railroad Co. 
exemplifies the tangle of challenges surrounding foreseeability and causation. In that 
case, the plaintiff Helen Palsgraf was waiting to board a train to Long Island. As the train 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  “The dominant test of proximate cause in torts makes a defendant liable when but only when the harm he 
in fact caused was, at the time he acted, foreseeable to him...” (Moore, 1997. P. 363) 
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was pulling away, two men with a package raced to jump aboard. One man made it onto 
the train; the other, carrying a package, stumbled to catch the train. Several train 
employees rushed to help the package-carrier onto the train. The package, which the 
would-be passenger then dropped, turned out to contain fireworks. It exploded, causing 
injury to Palsgraf. Palsgraf sued the railroad company for negligence. The first ruling was 
in Palsgraf’s favor: she was awarded $6000 in damages. Upon appeal, however, the 
decision was overturned. A judge ruled that “Here, by concession, there was nothing in 
the situation to suggest to the most cautious mind that the parcel wrapped in newspaper 
would spread wreckage throughout the station.” A dissenting opinion was also issued, 
suggesting that “given such an explosion as here, it needed no great foresight to predict 
that the natural result would be to injure one on the platform at no greater distance from 
its scene than was the plaintiff.” (1928 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99) The lasting upshot of 
the case is that a defendant who is found negligent is only liable for foreseeable harm or 
the actual injury rather than for every injury resulting from the negligent act. 
 In the British case Re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co Ltd, a defendant’s 
employees loaded cargo onto a ship. Due to an employee’s negligence, a plank fell into 
the hold of the ship. The plank then caused a spark that ignited some gas vapor in the 
hold. The gas vapor caused an explosion that destroyed the ship. The court ruled that “a 
defendant can be held liable for all consequences flowing from the wrongful conduct 
regardless of how unforeseeable.” (1921 3 KB 560) The concept of strict liability for 
unforeseeable outcomes has now been stricken from British law, but its implications 
remain controversial even in contemporary legal thought.  
  Finally, in Mauney v. Gulf Refining Co., an oil refinement company negligently 
set a fire. As people were frantically running from the refinery fire, a woman who 
operated a bakery across the street grabbed her child and started running. She tripped 
over a chair and had a miscarriage, later suing Gulf Refining Company for negligence. 
The court ruled in favor of Gulf Refining Company holding: “If the appellant didn’t see a 
chair in her way in her own place of business it would impose an inadmissible burden on 
appellees to say that they should have seen from across the street and through the walls of 
a building on another corner what appellant did not see right at her feet.” (1942, Supreme 
Court of Mississippi) 
 Though this seems like the correct result, legal scholars differ on what the lesson 
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should be from this and similar sorts of cases. Of Mauney v. Gulf Refining Co., Hart and 
Honoré (1985) lament: “Here the court not merely insists on applying the practical test of 
foreseeability in order to determine the limit of responsibility but also requires such 
detailed provision that if similar criteria were generally followed, recovery for ulterior 
harm would seldom be allowed.” (p. 267) 
 A related problem is that the law is ambiguous between in-principle foreseeability 
and in-practice foreseeability. Moore, for example, finds the foreseeability constraint too 
demanding, arguing, “[The rule of foreseeability] looks as if it meant that a motorist 
while driving should think not merely of the children whom he sees crossing the street, 
but of the adults who might dash out to rescue them, and of the surgeons who might 
operate on them negligently should they be run over and taken to a hospital.” (2010, p. 
265) Exactly how much thought must be put into each ordinary action, let alone non-
ordinary ones, in order to forestall liability? This explanatory obstacle is not 
insurmountable, but there is much more work to be done before a foreseeability condition 
can reliably solve problems involving deviant causation.  
 
5.2 Adding A Non-Deviant Causation Requirement to Legal Responsibility 
 
 Another tempting solution is to include a stipulation in the law that the criminal or 
tortious causal relationship between the act and the outcome be non-deviant. Yaffe 
(2018), for example, includes a non-deviance stipulation in his definition of the correct 
role of the intention in guiding an action, and also in an independent account of criminal 
culpability. Husak (correspondence) proposes that a defendant should not liable when the 
outcome “is too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a just bearing on the 
actor’s liability or on the gravity of his offense.”  	   There are several problems with this strategy, however. First: in some cases, 
deviant causes should be the subjects of legal responsibility. Consider the following case: 
  
 (Ricochet) Jane intends to murder Jacintha. Jane shoots at Jacintha, but the bullet 
 ricochets off of a giant slab of marble, and then strikes and kills Jacintha.  
 
Arguably, this is a deviant causal chain. Arguably, Jane is legally culpable for Jacintha’s 
death even though it did not occur in the way she had planned. Any blanket requirement 
for legal responsibility involving non-deviant causation is bound to run into similar 
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counterexamples. 
 Second, philosophers struggle to draw a principled distinction between deviant 
and non-deviant causation5, and such a distinction would be essential to any legal theory 
based on it. Since the default/ deviant distinction is irreducibly tied to norms and 
intentions regarding a particular causal scenario, it is extremely implausible that a 
principled metaphysical distinction can be drawn in such cases. There is no mind-
independent, structural metaphysical difference between Assassin A’s and Assassin B’s 
shots. The difference between the shots involves Assassin A’s expectation about the 
causal process resulting from his shot. Mutatis mutandis for other deviant causal chains. 
 Third, since the difference between a deviant and non-deviant causal chain 
depends on a particular agent’s intentions regarding the outcome, such intentions must be 
evidentially accessible rather than self-reported. One can easily imagine criminal actors 
and tortfeasors claiming “But I didn’t intend for the death to happen in that particular 
way!” How these claims are to be legally evaluated poses an insurmountable obstacle to 
using such a distinction, and it’s arguable, in some cases, that the particular nature of the 
outcome should matter so much. 
 
5.3 Denying the Transitivity of Causation 
 
 Causation is transitive when, if a causes b and b causes c, a thereby causes c. 
Transitivity of causation undergirds deviant causation: the gunshot causes the water 
buffalo stampede that causes Victim’s death, thus the gunshot causes Victim’s death. 
Rejecting the transitivity of causation in cases of deviant causal chains, or rejecting 
automatic transitivity of causation more generally, is a tempting solution. In Bad Shot, for 
example, one might hold that Assassin A causes Assassin B to shoot, and Assassin B 
causes Victim’s death, but Assassin A does not thereby cause Victim’s death. 
 This strategy is problematic for several reasons, however. Denying the transitivity 
of causation only in deviant cases requires a principled deviant/ non-deviant causation 
distinction. As I suggested in §5.2, the prospects for such a distinction are poor: the 
distinction is irreducibly mind-dependent and context sensitive, and it is poorly suited to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  See e.g. Peacocke 1979, Davidson 1980, Mitchell 1982, Schlosser 2007, McDonnell 2015, Blanchard 
and Schaffer 2017.  
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play such a central legal role. 
 Denying the transitivity of causation more generally is theoretically costly. 
Transitivity is a central intuitive datum about the nature of causation. Setting aside well-
known independent problems with transitivity,6 many take the transitivity of causal 
chains to be a theoretical desideratum of a theory of causation owing to its significant 
explanatory power. Such explanatory power is particularly central to legal explanations, 
in which causal relationships between proximate causes and their effects often have 
causal intermediaries. For example, an accomplice who hands his partner the gun thereby 
causally contributes to the crime. 
 Denying the transitivity of causation requires principles of demarcation for causal 
chains. For example, why does my driving my car to the coffee shop cause me to drink 
coffee, but not my purchase of my car a decade prior? If we are to deny that purchasing 
my car ten years ago caused my coffee-drinking, we must have a metaphysical or 
explanatory principle for ruling out the car purchase as a cause. But it is very difficult to 
give a principled account of when a causal chain stops and another begins. Moore (2009) 
holds that causation peters out as the number of events in a causal chain increases. But 
there are several reasons to reject this idea. Clearly there are causal relationships between 
spatiotemporally distant events, like the discovery of a slate mine 300 years ago and 
current slate prices, or exposure to asbestos and mesothelioma 25 years after exposure. 
Further, it seems very unlikely that we will be able to give a principled measure of the 
degree to which causation “weakens” over time.7 Such a measure would have to take a 
stand on the individuation conditions for events, answering questions like: was Jane’s 
preparing the poison one event or three events? Was the commencement ceremony one 
event or hundreds of little ones? The law would have to take a stand on the existence and 
persistence conditions for causal chains, weighing in on issues like why a causal chain 
counterfactually dependent on, say, Jane’s birth, begins at that particular moment far 
after her birth and ends at that other moment, versus a moment before and a moment 
later. Such a principle must also include implausibly broad generalizations about the 
boundaries of causal chains: causal chains peter out after n number of events or n years or 
n meters, etc. Denying transitivity of causation guts the explanatory power of many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See, for example, Sartorio (2005), Paul (2000), and more recently, McDonnell (2018). 
7 See Beebee (2013), Bernstein (2017) and Kaiserman (2017), (forthcoming) for more on the prospects of 
making sense of “degrees of causation.” 
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causal claims while incurring a massive, unmanageable explanatory burden of its own.8 
 
5.4 Modifying the type of Causation Required for Legal Responsibility 
 
 Since problems with deviant causal chains get off the ground due to the but-for 
test for causation, one seemingly attractive (if somewhat radical) solution is to modify the 
central concept of causation in the law. A natural alternative to viewing causation as 
counterfactual dependence is instead to view causation as a “productive” relation. 
According to productive accounts of causation, c causes e if c transfers some sort of 
physical energy, mark, or “oomph” to e. A paradigmatic case of productive causation is 
one domino hitting another. The legal test for causation would then be: is it the case that a 
physical process relates the putative cause and effect?9 This modification is tempting 
because in many deviant causal chain cases, the initiator does not transfer energy to the 
outcome. In Bad Shot, for example, Assassin A’s shot does not seem to physically 
interact with Victim. Thus it would not pass a modified legal test for causation. 
 On balance, however, such a modification wouldn’t help. Productive causation 
isn’t generally well-suited to be a legal test for causation, since there are countless 
physical interactions with each outcome that are not legally relevant. Suppose that, in 
Bad Shot, a hapless intern assassin had been hoping to eliminate the target by playing a 
very loud boombox. (And suppose, further, that boomboxes were still in production.) 
Then the auditory vibrations of the boombox constitute a plethora of minute physical 
interactions between the hapless intern’s activities and Victim’s death. Even in the 
original Bad Shot case, the vibrations of Assassin A’s shot might physically interact with 
Victim in minute, microscopic ways. But such interactions do not seem morally or legally 
relevant: the liberal, productive sense of “cause” is not alone suitable for legal use.10 
Moreover, some deviant causal chains do contain unbroken chains of productive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  McDonnell (2018) develops a strategy of using proportionality to pick out the causal relations that 
reliably change, without appealing to transitivity. According to his view, if an agent’s intention does not 
match an intermediate event in the right way, then a chained causal relation cannot be safely assumed. I do 
not discuss such a strategy here, but I do find it promising. 9	  Hart and Honoré seem to agree that such a modification is warranted in some legal cases, writing “Only 
by identifying causation literally with the setting in motion of a physical process which has not come to an 
end can the cause be said still to be contributing to the event.” (p. 244) 10	  See Bernstein (2017) for an argument that a productive theory of causation is not well-suited to moral 
and legal aims.	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causation. Consider a modified version of Bad Shot:  
 
 (Boulder) An unskilled gunman intends to shoot and kill someone. He shoots and 
 misses his target, but the gunshot strikes a boulder, which then rolls down onto 
 Victim, killing him. 
 
In this case, the gunshot transfers energy to the boulder, which then transfers energy to 
the Victim, killing him. Deviant causal chains cannot be ruled out by modifying the 
notion of causation into a productive one. 
 
5.5 Dropping Causation in Favor of Causal Verbs 
 
 Finally, one might be tempted to drop talk of causation altogether in favor of 
causal verbs. For example: for A to murder B, A doesn’t just make it such that B’s death 
occurs; A kills B. With respect to deviant causal chains, one can then say that the initiator 
makes it the case that the outcome occurred, but didn’t cause it. In Bad Shot, for example, 
one might say that Assassin A made it the case that Victim died, but A didn’t kill Victim. 
And in Murderous Lover, one might say that Jane made it the case that Jacintha died, but 
Jane didn’t kill Jacintha. 
 As one might imagine, there are problems with this strategy as well. Presumably, 
what unites causal verbs is just that they are specific instances of causation: killing, 
poisoning, and shooting are just particular instantiations of the causal relation. They are 
determinates of a common determinable. Causal verbs cannot be explicated in non-
circular, non-causal terms.  
 Further, unpacking the causal verbs will just bring back the problem of whether or 
not a causal chain is deviant. To claim that Assassin A brought about Victim’s death but 
didn’t kill Victim is just to stipulate that Assassin A initiates a deviant causal chain. As I 
discuss in §5.2, such a distinction is irreducibly anthropocentric and difficult to produce 
and apply in a principled way.  
 
  
6. Conclusions 
 
 Deviant causal chains pose counterexamples for several central legal concepts, 
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including the legal distinction between attempts and completed crimes, attempts and mere 
preparations, and the joint sufficiency of mens rea, actus reus, and actual causation for 
legal responsibility. In addition to providing counterexamples, deviant causal chains lay 
bare heretofore underexplored wide vulnerabilities in the law. Here I have focused on 
attempts and negligence, but similar problems can be generated for many other legal 
concepts and distinctions, including (e.g.) the distinction between serious and non-serious 
criminal attempts, proximate versus non-proximate causation, completed versus 
abandoned criminal attempts, and substantial vs. non-substantial steps to complete 
crimes. Despite the existence of a long history of legal thought on causation in the law, 
the relevance of the particular nature of causal processes to legal responsibility remains 
underexplored. If I am right, much more investigation is warranted.11 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Thanks to audiences at University of Barcelona, Columbia University, Bowling Green 
University, and Rutgers University for very helpful feedback on this paper. Thanks also 
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